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FUTURE INTERESTS-RESTRAINTS ON ALIBNATION-VALIDITY OF PRE-EMPTIVE

PROVISION-Defendant purchased a strip of land lying between his residence
and the plaintiff's for $2,550. Immediately thereafter and pursuant to
a prior understanding, he conveyed the west half to plaintiff for one
half the price he paid for the entire tract. As a part of this transaction
it was agreed that should either party desire to sell his portion of the lot at
any time in the future, he would first offer it to the other at its original
cost plus any amounts expended for improvements. When defendant
was offered $3,500 for his half seven years later, he disregarded this agreement and accepted the offer. Plaintiff's action for specific performance of
the contract was dismissed. On appeal, held, affirmed. Although the
arrangement does not violate the rule against perpetuities, it is nevertheless void as a direct restraint on alienation. Kershner v. Hurlburt, (Mo.
1955) 277 S.W. (2d) 619.
Pre-emptions, or "first refusals," differ from ordinary options because they are not exercisable until the owner of the property decides to
sell it.1 Upon the happening of this event the holder has a reasonable
time in which to decide whether or not he wants to purchase.2 Basically, there
are two kinds of pre-emptions.3 In one type the holder is preferred
if he matches a third party's bona fide offer which is acceptable to the
owner; in the other, as typified by the principal case, the pre-emption
price is fixed at the time the agreement is entered into. 4 Since the pricematching variety does little more than add a potential buyer, its restraint
on alienation is negligible and seemingly should be permitted.5 However,
because a pre-emption involves a contingent future interest as well as a
possible direct restraint on alienation, there are decisions in which the
rule against perpetuities has been applied to these pre-emptions6 and viola1 Something less than actual sale to another person will establish the requisite state
of mind. Hathaway v. Nevitt, 358 Mo. 202, 213 S.W. (2d) 938 (1948).
2 5 CORBIN, CoNTRACIS §1197 (1951).
3 See 4 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT §413, comment a, illus. 1, 2 (1944).
4 Interesting variations on these types are presented in Concannon v. Haile, 81 Pa.
D & C. 480 (1952) and Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926).
5 See Weber v. Texas Co., (5th Cir. 1936) 83 F. (2d) 807, cert. den. 299 U.S. 561, 57
S.Ct. 23 (1936); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §26.65 (1952).
6 The use of this rule as the criterion of validity seems unsound because the duration
of a pre-emption bears no necessary relation to the extent of the burden it imposes on
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tions of it found. 7 Where the pre-emption is at a fixed price, the degree
of restraint imposed in a particular situation will be determined by the
extent to which realizable value exceeds pre-emption price.8 In the interests
of certainty it has been suggested that the mere insertion of a fixed price
should render a pre-emptive provision void. 9 Under this approach the provision is viewed solely as a direct restraint and thus its duration is immaterial. Only a few of the cases handle the problem in this simple manner.10
In the others enforceability depends wholly or in part upon whether or not
the pre-emption involved is construed so as to violate the rule against perpetuities.11 Although the court in the principal case follows the practice
of applying both rules, the outcome of the dual tests here is apparently
unique in the law thus far. The result is a square holding that although
the pre-emption does not offend the rule against perpetuities,12 it must
nevertheless be struck down as violative of the rule against restraints.is This
is a significant step toward recognition that the latter rule should be determinative in the case of pre-emptions. It may be anticipated that it will lead
ultimately to the conclusion that the rule against perpetuities has no relaevancy in this area whatever.14
There is a dictum in the principal case that the instant provision,
and in fact any direct restraint not intended to last longer than the period of
the rule against perpetuities, would be permitted if it were reasonable.115
A reasonable restraint is defined as one which is imposed for a socially or economically desirable purpose. Kentucky is apparently the
alienability and also because the rule itself contemplates non-commercial dispositions
of property whereas pre-emptions are commonly found in connection with commercial
transactions. Professor Schnebly, writing in 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §26.66 (1952),
objects to the practice and makes the persuasive point that the operation of the rule
might be overcome in most jurisdictions (assuming the usual case where the right is to
be conferred on the grantor of the property) merely by the device of phrasing the preemption in forfeiture rather than promiswry terms. This is so because the rule in this
country, absent statutes to the contrary, is that powers of termination are not subject to
the rule. See 3 SIMES AND S:i.um, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §1238 (1956).
7 Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 290 Ky. 132, 160 S.W. (2d) 654 (1942); Roberts v. Jones,
307 Mass. 504, 30 N.E. (2d) 392 (1940).
s In a leading English case, In re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 801 (1884), the ratio was 5:1 and
the court held this equivalent to an absolute restraint. Should the value fall below the
price of the pre-emption, the latter loses both its power to restrain and its economic value.
9 This is the position taken in 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §413 (1944) and in 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§26.65, 26.67 (1952).
10 Two which approximate this approach are DePeyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467
(1852) and Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141, 15 P. 451 (1887).
llSee, e.g.: Henderson v. Bell, 103 Kan. 422, 173 P. 1124 (1918); Lewis Oyster Co. v.
West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 A. 138 (1919); Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W. (2d)
568 (1944).
12 The covenant was interpreted as intended to be binding only on the immediate
parties. Principal case at 623.
13 Principal case at 626.
14 See note 6 supra.
15 The alleged purpose of this restraint, i.e., to prevent the erection of business
property on the site, was belied by the express allowance for improvements without any
hint that they be restricted to a particular type. Principal case at 626.
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only jurisdiction with a doctrine of reasonable restraints presently
·in force.16 There the standard professedly applied is one of "reasonable time,'' but it has been pointed out that the purpose of· the restraint
often influences the results reached.17 Although it seems desirable to allow
restraints on alienation for some commercial purposes for fairly short
periods of time, a doctrine of reasonable restraints does not provide an
adequate means for doing this because it is inherently subject to litigation
and casts doubt on the status of titles.18 It appears that such exceptions
could best be handled by statutes drawn to cover only specifically defined
types of situations.
Julian Linde

16 The Kentucky cases are discussed in Roberts, "Future Property Interests in Kentucky," 13 KY. L. J. 186 (1925).
17Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARV.
L. R.Ev. 373 at 405 (1935).
·
18 See Andrews v. Hall, 156 Neb. 817, 58 N.W. (2d) 201 (1953), the case abrogating
Nebraska's then existing reasonable restraints doctrine.

